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Term Limits and Turmoil:
Roe v. Wade's Whiplash
Christopher Sundby* and Suzanna Sherry"
A fixed eighteen-year term for Supreme Court Justices has become a
popularproposal with both academics and the general public as a possible
solution to the countermajoritariandifficulty and as a meansfor depoliticizing
the confirmationprocess. While scholars have extensively examined the potential
benefits of term limits, the potential costs have been underexplored. We focus on
one cost: the possible effects of term limits on doctrinalstability. Using seven
statisticalmodels that measurepotentialfluctuation in Supreme Court support
for Roe v. Wade had the Court been operating under term limits since 1973,
we explore the level of constitutionalinstability that a term-limit system would
engender. Our models incorporatevarying degrees ofeach new Justice's loyalty
to the nominating president'sideology and deference to precedent, as well as
accountfor the Senate's level of influence on the confirmation process under
conditions including the elimination of the filibuster. The results suggest that
term limits couldfundamentally change the way that the law evolves and might
well lead to a substantialloss in doctrinalstability.
Introduction
There's a new kid in town trying to resolve the countermajoritarian
difficulty and its consequences. Rather than proposing increasingly elaborate
theories to limit the Supreme Court's discretion, some scholars, politicians,
and pundits have decided to welcome the Court to the bar of politics. Worried
about the Court's tendency to act as a political body-that is, as nine
legislators in black robes decreeing policy'-they propose to treat it as one
by imposing term limits as a substitute for periodic elections. That way, they
reason, every president will be able to appoint at least two Justices, and the
Court will reflect a mix of the political views of the last three or four
presidents and thus of the American people as a whole. It will, in short, no
longer be so strongly countermajoritarian.

Joint J.D. and Ph.D. (neuroscience) candidate, Vanderbilt University (expected 2020).
Herman 0. Loewenstein Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
1. One of us has written extensively on why this view is wrong. See generally DANIEL A.
FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (2009); Suzanna Sherry, Puttingthe Law Back in ConstitutionalLaw, 25 CONST. COMMENT.
461 (2009); Suzanna Sherry, Politicsand Judgment, 70 Mo. L. REv. 973 (2005). For purposes of
this Essay, however, we take the attitudinalist model as valid; judges decide most cases based on
their own political preferences moderated by strategic concerns. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt,
Attitudes About Attitudes, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1733, 1739 (2003).
*

**
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Unlike many other proposals to limit judicial discretion using theories
of interpretation, the idea of term limits has no clear ideological agenda and
has been supported by scholars on both the left and the right. Perhaps most
striking in today's era of partisan politics, a public-opinion poll found over
70% support among Democrats and Republicans for imposing eighteen-year
term limits. 2 Support may have increased following the Republican Senate's
decision not to grant a hearing to President Obama's Supreme Court nominee
Merrick Garland, which added to the perception that Supreme Court
appointments depend on political power plays rather than on a reasoned
process.' Term limits, proponents argue, would eliminate the need for this
type of game playing, as appointments would take place on a regularized
schedule.' Term limits would also lower the stakes for each nomination,
perhaps inducing presidents to favor excellence over youth and ideology.
Are term limits, however, the white knight that they first appear to be?
While the benefits of term limits are both intuitive and well explored by
distinguished scholars,' they have a potentially grave downside: they
arguably undermine legal stability and detrimentally affect the incremental
development of constitutional doctrine. This Essay begins assessing this
underexplored and underappreciated effect on legal stability and doctrinal
development by tracking the fate of one of the Court's more controversial
decisions, Roe v. Wade.6 We ask a simple question: What would have
happened to Roe over the years if the Justices since 1973 had served under
eighteen-year term limits rather than having life tenure?
The Essay answers this question using statistical models that place a
new Justice on the bench every two years. The models assume that five
variables influence each new Justice's behavior: the party of the nominating
president, the confirming Senate's party composition and the degree of
influence it exerts, and the new Justices' degree of loyalty to the nominating
party and deference to precedent. Using these five variables, the study models

2. Stan Greenberg et al., Broad Bi-PartisanConsensus Supports Reforms to Supreme Court,
DEMOCRACY CORPS tbl.5 (May 7, 2014), https://democracycorps.com//wp-content/uploads/2014
/05/DCorps-SCOTUS-Memo-FINAL-050614.pdf [https://perma.cc/P43T-YJEX].
3. Jess Bravin, President Obama's Supreme Court Nomination of Merrick GarlandExpires,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3, 2017, 5:23 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/president-obamas-supremecourt-nomination-of-merrick-garland-expires-1483463952 [https://perma.cc/S6SA-2JVL].
4. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 310 (2014).
5. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, The Supreme Court Renewal Act: A
Return to Basic Principles, in REFORMING THE COURT 467, 471 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D.
Carrington eds., 2006); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 123-39 (2006);
Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure
Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 769, 775 (2006); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The BrokenHeartedLover: Erwin Chemerinsky's Romantic Longingsfor a Mythical Court, 69 VAND. L. REV.
1075, 1109 (2016).
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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the outcomes of a hypothetical reconsideration of Roe v. Wade from 1973
through the end of President Trump's first term (2019, the last opportunity
for him to nominate a Justice under a term-limits scheme). By using
probability models to look at the likely effects that term limits would have on
an actual holding, we hope to give scholars and policy makers a more cleareyed view of the effects that term limits might have on current constitutional
doctrines and the way in which the law evolves.
Our results reveal that term limits are very likely to have negative
consequences for stability. But the size of those consequences depends on the
degree of independence that Justices exhibit from the partisan politics of their
nominators and on their degree of deference to precedent.' If Justices exhibit
low levels of ideological conformity to the views of their nominating
president and have a strong deference to precedent, a term-limit system may
have minimal effects on long-term doctrinal stability. On the other hand, if
Justices show moderate or strong ideological alignment with the views of
their nominating president and/or little to no deference to precedent, term
limits could result in a far less stable constitutional doctrine with major
precedents being reversed and then reinstituted from Term to Term.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I begins with a theoretical
discussion of the potential for term limits to address the countermajoritarian
difficulty, including its underexplored potential impact on constitutional
doctrinal stability and how the law evolves. Subpart II(A) discusses the goals
of presidents and the Senate in selecting and confirming Justices.
Subpart H(B) introduces three statistical models, describing Justices who
exhibit moderate, high, or low loyalty-that is, the likelihood that a nominee
will vote in line with his or her nominator's policy preferences. The models
evaluate the impact on the stability of constitutional doctrine, specifically
Roe v. Wade, when the most senior Justice is replaced every two years.
Subpart 1(C) discusses the potential stabilizing role of deference to
precedent, modeling the difference between high and low deference to
precedent. Subpart II(D) delves into the role of the Senate confirmation
7. The most recent Supreme Court Terms suggest that, at least today, many Justices have a high
degree of ideological conformity with their nominating president and a low degree of deference to
precedent. As two scholars have recently noted, partisan loyalty has been increasing: "In the past
10 years ... justices have hardly ever voted against the ideology of the president who appointed
them." Lee Epstein & Eric Posner, If the Supreme CourtIsNakedly Political, Can It Be Just?, N.Y.
TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/opinion/supreme-court-nomineetrump.html [https://perma.cc/S5RC-8BXL]; see also Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split
Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP.
CT. REv. 301, 301 (2016) (recognizing that the Court's "clear ideological blocs that coincide[] with
party lines" are historically unique). As for deference to precedent, in the 2017 Term alone, the
Court overruled precedents from 1967, 1977, and 1992. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S.
Ct. 2080 (2018) (overturning Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) and Nat'l Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967)); Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018)
(overturning Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)). Whether term limits might
change either of these tendencies is beyond the scope of this Essay.
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process and its effect on stability. The loyalty and deference models assume
that the Senate has a moderate influence on the confirmation process. This
subpart briefly discusses the effect of assuming less influence, and then
models two additional scenarios: a Senate with greater influence, and a
moderately influential Senate without the possibility of a filibuster. Part III
concludes by discussing the broader implications of the study, the model's
limits, and directions for possible future research.
I.

Term Limits as the Proposed Antidote to the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty

A.

The CountermajoritarianDifficulty and PriorSolutions
No matter the label applied-judicial activism, 8 a lack of institutional
legitimacy, or the "counter-majoritarian difficulty"'o-criticisms of the
Supreme Court for usurping the will of the majority are widespread and often
fervent. The Court's recognition of a constitutional right to same-sex
marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges" is one of the most recent examples of a
decision becoming a lightning rod for claims that the Court has overstepped
its constitutional bounds.12 The bitter political fight over Merrick Garland's
confirmation furthered the public perception that the Court is no more than a
political body, making the Court a major issue during the 2016 primaries and

8. See, e.g., Craig Green, An Intellectual History ofJudicialActivism, 58 EMORY L.J. 1195,
1201-20 (2009) (discussing the origins and uses of the term "judicial activism").
9. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL

REVIEW (1980); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against JudicialReview, 115 YALE L.J.
1346 (2006).
10. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16, 203 (2d ed. 1962)

(coining the term "counter-majoritarian difficulty").
11. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
12. "Our founding fathers did not intend for the judicial branch to legislate from the bench, and
as president, I would appoint strict Constitutional conservatives who will apply the law as written";
"The only outcome worse than this flawed, failed decision would be for the President and Congress,
two co-equal branches of government, to surrender in the face of this out-of-control act of
unconstitutional, judicial tyranny." Matthew Speiser, Here's How the 2016 PresidentialCandidates
Are Reacting to the Supreme Court Ruling on Gay Marriage, BUS. INSIDER (June 26, 2015,
11:04 AM) (quoting Rick Perry and Mike Huckabee, respectively), http://www.businessinsider.com
/2016-reaction-to-gay-marriage-ruling-2015-6 [https://perma.cc/RG58-ECGT].
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general election.13 And the political circus of Brett Kavanaugh's
confirmation showed partisan politics at its worst.14
The concern over the Court's proper role, however, is almost as old as
the Constitution itself. Countless books and articles have been written about
the tension created by having a Supreme Court with unelected Justices
wielding the power of judicial review in a democracy.15 The term
"countermajoritarian difficulty" can be traced back to Alexander Bickel's
1962 book The Least Dangerous Branch.16 It refers to the challenge of
reconciling popular governance and a democratic government with the
practice of judicial review that allows nine unelected Justices to overturn the
will of the majority based on their interpretation of the Constitution. The
countermajoritarian difficulty has been called an "obsession," a
"preoccupation," and "the dominant paradigm of constitutional law and
scholarship."" In line with this perception of the countermajoritarian
difficulty as the central problem in constitutional law, most theories of
constitutional interpretation and judicial decision-making are designed to
lessen the tension between judicial review and majority rule by cabining

13. A Pew Research Center poll found that appointments to the Supreme Court were a top-ten
election issue heading into the 2016 presidential election, with 65% of respondents reporting it
would be an important factor in their voting decision. This put it above other prominent issues such
as abortion and the treatment of racial and ethnic minorities. 2016 Campaign: Strong Interest,
Widespread Dissatisfaction:4. Top Voting Issues in 2016 Election, PEW RES. CTR. (July 7, 2016),
http://www.people-press.org/2016/07/07/4-top-voting-issues-in-2016-election/
[https://perma.cc/
L6UQ-CF8Y]; see also Devins & Baum, supra note 7, at 302 (discussing the political rift created
over President Obama's attempts to appoint a successor to Justice Antonin Scalia and the
importance of the appointment to the 2016 presidential election); Katie Zezima, Cruz Wants to Make
2016 a Referendum on the Supreme Court: He's Already Done It, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/02/15/cruz-wants-to-make-2016-areferendum-on-the-supreme-court-hes-already-done-it/?utm-termp.793513a5caad
[https://
perma.cc/7K55-9M2V] (discussing Senator Ted Cruz's comments regarding the political
significance of replacing Justice Antonin Scalia on the Supreme Court).
14. For public reaction to the Kavanaugh confirmation, see, for example, Zack Beauchamp, The
Supreme Court's Legitimacy Crisis Is Here, Vox (Oct. 6, 2018, 4:02 PM), https://www.vox.com
/policy-and-politics/2018/10/6/17915854/brett-kavanaugh-senate-confirned-supreme-courtlegitimacy [https://perma.cc/V5FJ-83P7].
15. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and JudicialReview, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 578 (1993)
(discussing the degree to which constitutional scholars have fixated on the countermajoritarian

difficulty).
16. BICKEL, supra note 10.
17. Barry Friedman, The History ofthe CountermajoritarianDifficulty, PartOne: The Road to
JudicialSupremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 333, 335-36 (1998) (citing Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs
Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1046 (1984)); Akhil Reed Amar, The
Consent of the Governed: ConstitutionalAmendment Outside Article V, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 457,
495 (1994); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 61 (1989)).
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judicial discretion in some way. From process theory" to originalism,1 9 from
minimalism 20 and theories of moral rights 21 to constitutional dualism 2 2 and
intratextualism, 23 scholars have proposed ways to prevent judges from
substituting their own political preferences for those of the elected branches.
The theory of "popular constitutionalism" even goes so far in trying to relieve
the tension that it proposes revoking the Supreme Court's power of judicial
review altogether, or at least making it nonbinding.2 4 Whatever the theory,
trying to solve the countermajoritarian riddle has become the legal equivalent
of proving Fermat's Last Theorem.
This swirl of competing, and unsuccessful, theories has led some
scholars to propose a different sort of solution: Rather than limiting the
discretion of the Justices, they would limit the time period that Justices have
the ability to use (or abuse) their discretion, thus ensuring that the Justices'
political preferences mirror the political preferences of the nation as a whole.
B.

The Term-Limit Solution

A number of scholars have proposed term limits for Supreme Court
Justices, and the idea has support from both sides of the political aisle.25 One
of the most recent, and most concrete, proposals comes from Erwin
Chemerinsky. He proposes imposing eighteen-year term limits on Supreme

18. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 9.
19. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 143-60 (1990) (defending originalism on the grounds that it limits the countermajoritarian

difficulty); Randy E. Barnett, The GravitationalForce of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. 411,
429 (2013) (asserting that originalism should supersede Justices' political preferences).
20. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1999).
21. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE

AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996) (arguing that Justices employing a moral reading of the
Constitution is consistent with democracy and majority rule since the Bill of Rights commits only
to general principles which then must be interpreted and applied to specific circumstances).
22. See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) (arguing that
the Court should defer to the will of the people only during times of higher lawmaking, when the
people look past fleeting concerns and express their long-term desires for the future direction of the
nation).
23. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999).
24. See, e.g., MARK TUSIHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).

25. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramnton, Introduction to REFORMING THE COURT,
supra note 5, at 5-7 (noting the wide variety of scholars in favor of eliminating life tenure of
Supreme Court Justices); LEVINSON, supra note 5, at 123-39 (citing multiple scholars' arguments
against life tenure for Supreme Court Justices); Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 5, at 775 (arguing
for eighteen-year term limits for Supreme Court Justices); Rosenberg, supra note 5, at 1105, 1109
(describing the proposed term limit as the only reform proposed by Chemerinsky which "has the
potential to make much difference in the decisions of the Court" and as "supported by data,
experience, and the findings of the branch relations literature"); Greenberg et al., supra note 2, at
tbl.5 (demonstrating that Americans support term limits for Supreme Court Justices).
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Court Justices, with terms staggered to end every two years.26 Chemerinsky
argues that eighteen years is long enough for a Justice to master the job, but
not so long as to enshrine "political choices from decades earlier."2 7 The
term-limit proposal is meant to walk the tightrope between reducing the
countermajoritarian tendencies of the Court and fully democratizing the
judiciary. 28
This system would result in an appointment to the Supreme Court every
two years, or two nominees per presidential term. 29 This approach has several
advantages. First, it removes the fortuity of the timing of Supreme Court
vacancies and gives every president an equal opportunity to influence the
composition of the Court. Under the current system, Republicans have
nominated 73% of Justices since 1973 despite controlling the White House
only 55% of the time. The current system has also led to great variability
among presidents regarding the number of appointments: President Carter
never made an appointment, and President Franklin Roosevelt appointed
eight Justices serving a collective 150 years on the bench.30 The current
system also led to the contentious decision by Republicans not to grant a
hearing for President Obama's nominee Merrick Garland on the ground that
the vacancy occurred in the last year of his presidency.
In addition, term limits could relieve the pressure to nominate everyounger Justices to increase a president's period of influence, instead giving
the president more incentive to nominate the most qualified candidate. 3 1 A
term-limit regime also could potentially lead to a less contentious nomination
process and help eliminate the political problem that occurs when an
appointment arises close to a presidential election. Proponents argue that
term limits would also reduce the current partisan warfare over judicial
appointments: If the opposing party knows there will be another nomination
in two years, and that they might be the party nominating, that reduces the
stakes and might help facilitate compromise.
Moreover, Chemerinsky argues that not only would term limits solve
difficult practical issues, but that they are more consistent with the term

26. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 310.
27. Id. at 311.
28. Id. Thomas Jefferson actually first proposed term limits back in 1822 after concluding that
life tenure is inconsistent with the American republic. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 5, at
773 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William T. Barry (July 2, 1822), in 7 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 255, 256 (HA. Washington ed., 1854)).
29. Scholars Calabresi and Lindgren have suggested enacting the proposal by statute, although
most scholars argue that any change would have to be done either through unenforceable norms or
a constitutional amendment. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 5, at 855-56 (proposing statute).
30. Ryan C. Black & Amanda C. Bryan, The Policy Consequences of Term Limits on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 821, 835 (2016).
31. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 310 (discussing the relative youth of recent nominees).
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length the Founders envisioned.3 2 The average Supreme Court tenure
between 1789 and 1970 compared to 1970 to 2005 has nearly doubled,
growing from fifteen years to twenty-six years.3 3 In 2015, five sitting Justices
had served for over twenty years.34 Chemerinsky argues that today's longer
tenure may actually interfere with the democratic balance that the Founders
intended to create. While the Supreme Court is meant to be insulated from
direct political influences and serve as a counterweight to the majoritarian
process, the nomination and confirmation process is meant to be a democratic
check on the Court.35 As term lengths have increased, making nominations
and confirmation hearings less frequent, it is possible that the Supreme Court
has become more countermajoritarian than the Framers intended, leading to
an imbalance and divorcing the Justices' views from the current society's
needs and values.3 6 As a concrete example, Gerald Rosenberg has argued that
the New Deal standoff between the executive and the judiciary may have
been partly a result of increased tenure length that led to a Court out of step
with changes in society." On this view, term limits are not a new, radical
intervention, but rather a mechanism to restore the balance the Founders
intended.
Term limits also enjoy a broad base of support-many scholars from
across the ideological spectrum, over 70% of the public, including a majority
of both Democrats and Republicans, and even a current Supreme Court
Justice have expressed support for the proposal.

32. See id. (discussing the increase in life expectancy since the Constitution was written).
33. Id.
34. Rosenberg, supra note 5, at 1109-10.
35. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 311; see also Paul M. Collins, Jr. & Lori A. Ringhand, The
Institutionalizationof Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings, 41 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 126, 141
(2016) (discussing how changes in the confirmation hearing process have increased democratic
checks on the Court).
36. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 311.
37. Rosenberg, supra note 5, at 1110.
38. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 310; Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 5, at 775; Barry
Friedman, Letter to Supreme Court (Erwin Chemerinsky Is Mad. Why You Should Care.), 69 VAND.
L. REV. 995, 1007-08 (2016); John 0. McGinnis, Justice Without Justices, 16 CONST. COMMENT.
541, 541-43 (1999); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1211 (1988); Saikrishna B. Prakash, America's Aristocracy, 109 YALE L.J.
541, 570-73 (1999) (book review); Akhil Reed Amar & Steven G. Calabresi, Term Limits for the
High Court, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2002), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2002
/08/09/term-limits-for-the-high-court/646134cd-8el3-4166-9474-5f53be633d7c/?noredirect-on
[https://perma.cc/M9NM-KNC9?type=image]; Seema Mehta, Huckabee Callsfor Term Limits on
U.S. Supreme CourtJustices, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 28,2015,3:52 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation
[https://
/politics/politicsnow/a-pn-huckabee-term-linits-supreme-court-20150328-story.htmI
perma.cc/3PRY-DC26]; Stephanie Francis Ward, Justice Breyer Says He Could Support Certain
SCOTUS Term Limits, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 8, 2016, 1:15 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article
[https://perma.cc/UR7C/justicebreyer-says-he-could-supportcertain scotusterm limits
FGRT].
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Yet while the potential benefits of Supreme Court term limits have
garnered considerable scholarly attention, the same cannot be said of the
potential costs. In particular, a term-limit regime might cause increased
instability in constitutional doctrine. Like all judicial reforms, the imposition
of term limits would not operate in a vacuum but would interact with judicial
decision-making principles such as stare decisis, the common law evolution
of judicial doctrine, and the real-world influences of politics and personal
predilections. Term limits, combined with the increased politicization of the
confirmation process that Chemerinsky advocates,39 might reduce the role of
precedent in constitutional doctrine, and thus lead to an increase in doctrinal
instability.
Only one study has empirically examined the potential differences
between a life-tenured Court and a term-limited Court.40 The authors
concluded that switching to a term-limit system would result in larger shifts
in the ideological medians, as measured by Martin-Quinn scores,41 and that
these shifts would mirror more general political shifts in the country.42
Although these findings support the argument that a term-limit regime would
increase democratic responsiveness, they also hint that such a regime might
increase instability, perhaps to an intolerable degree.4 3 Policy makers
considering the adoption of term limits should weigh the cost to stability
against the gains in democratic responsiveness. To do so, however, we need
to be able to measure the likely amount of instability that term limits (in
particular, the staggered eighteen-year term limit Chemerinsky proposes)
would introduce into the system. The remainder of this Essay explores that
question.

39. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 306-10.
40. Black & Bryan, supra note 30, at 843 (presenting data on how term limits might have altered
the Court's composition and its legal outputs for the last half century). Importantly, their work
focuses on how doctrine would actually be different, whereas our focus is on how doctrine might
evolve differently. For example, their analysis asks whether Roe v. Wade would have been decided
differently in 1973 in a term-limit system but fails to consider its doctrinal stability over time.
41. Martin-Quinn scores place Justices and Courts on an ideological continuum from
conservative to liberal based on each Justice's ideal policy set point. See generally Andrew D.
Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal PointEstimation Via Markov Chain Monte Carlofor the
U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002).
42. Black & Bryan, supra note 30, at 843.
43. See also Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 5, at 844 (discussing how the Court could shift
too rapidly in a term-limit system); Ward Farnsworth, The Regulation of Turnover on the Supreme
Court, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 407, 436-38 (2005) (discussing Supreme Court capture and how one
party winning four elections in a row could swing the court from unanimously liberal to
unanimously conservative).
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Empirically Examining the Effects of Term Limits on Supreme Court
Precedent: Term Limits and the Fate of Roe v. Wade from 1973 to

2019
In the abstract it is hard to know to what extent Supreme Court term
limits would undermine stability, but without that information, we cannot
weigh the benefits against the costs. This study attempts to gain insight into
term limits' impact on legal stability by using a prominent, some would say
notorious, Supreme Court case as a test: What would the fate of Roe v. Wade
have been under an eighteen-year term-limit system? As contentious as the
case is, it has thus far withstood the test of time and survived since it was
decided in 1973. Would a term-limit system have changed this?
Roe v. Wade was selected for the model for several reasons. Most
importantly, it has become a litmus test for judicial nominees that serves as a
proxy for a Justice's view on a variety of substantive issues and as a "marker
of his or her liberalism or conservatism, indicating the way he or she views
the role of ajudge and the proper approach to the law."" The case has become
so politicized that it was the "central question" surrounding Chief Justice
Roberts's confirmation hearing." Given that proponents of term limits view
judicial decision-making as inherently political, Roe is therefore an ideal test
case for assessing the effects of term limits. By studying how term limits
might have affected the fate of Roe, we can gain insight into how much
doctrinal instability could be produced (at least in politically salient cases) by
the imposition of term limits.
All of our models posit that eighteen-year term limits were imposed on
Supreme Court Justices prior to 1973, and that the first new Justice following
the enactment was due to be appointed in 1975, two years after Roe v. Wade
was decided. The Essay then uses statistical models to predict, biennially
from 1973 to 2019 (the last year in which President Trump would replace a
Justice during his first term in office), the outcome of a case considering the
reversal of Roe v. Wade-or, if the model predicts a prior reversal, a
subsequent case considering the reinstatement of the principles of Roe.
We recognize that any analysis of term limits must account for the
diversity of theories about how Justices make their decisions. The Essay takes
this into account by presenting seven distinct scenarios accounting for three
factors that to varying degrees have been identified as influencing judicial
decision-making: the loyalty of a Justice to the nominating president's

44. David R. Stras, Understandingthe New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 86 TEXAS L.
REv. 1033, 1037 (2008) (book review) (quoting JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT
221 (2007)). For a more general discussion of the shift from judicial competence and qualifications
to political ideology as the core issue in Supreme Court confirmation battles, see generally Richard
L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? PoliticalPolarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S.
CAL. L. REv. 205 (2013).
45. Stras, supra note 44, at 1037.
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political values, a Justice's deference to precedent, and the amount of
influence exerted by the Senate asked to ratify the nomination. All the models
also factor in the nominating president's party and the party composition of
the Senate, using the actual historical data. The strength of our approach is
that it allows each reader to consider the assumptions he or she believes are
most accurate and most relevant to predicting a Justice's voting behavior and
then calculate the likely impact of term limits on doctrinal stability given
those assumptions. Readers, for example, who believe that a Justice's
political ideology plays only a small role should focus on a less loyal model
like Model 3. Those who think Justices defer strongly to precedent should
turn to Model 5. Readers in between might focus on the moderately loyal
model, Model 1, which acknowledges the role of ideology but does not view
it as a lockstep influence. Each model thus assigns a value to the likelihood
that a Justice would vote to uphold Roe v. Wade (or a subsequent case
overruling or reinstating it), depending on the party of the nominating
president, the makeup of the confirming Senate, the amount of influence the
Senate exerts on the appointment process, the degree that Justices favor
deferring to precedent, and the degree of loyalty that Justices exhibit toward
their nominating president's party.
The study then analyzes, under each model, the effect of a term-limit
plan that replaces the most senior Justice with a new Justice every two years.
In other words, following Chemerinsky's proposal, the model assumes that
every two years after Roe, the then-president (in 1975, President Ford) would
replace the most senior Justice (in 1975, William Brennan) with his own
nominee; in 1977, then-President Carter would replace the most senior
Justice (Byron White) with his nominee; and this process would continue
through 2019. As the hypothetical Supreme Court changes every two years,
the study then presents the newly constituted Court the opportunity to affirm
or overturn Roe (or a subsequent case overruling or reinstating it) under each
model's varying assumptions about the new Justice's voting proclivities.4 6
While an actual Court probably would not have chosen to rehear Roe on
a biennial basis from 1975 forward, these hypotheticals help inform us how
the Court would likely have voted under a term-limit regime had they decided
to reconsider Roe in any given year. Considering all seven scenarios from
1975 through 2019 thus provides an informed sense of the real-world impact
of term limits on doctrinal stability and allows exploration of how different
models of judicial decision-making and doctrinal stability intersect with a
term-limit system.
The study uses the Monte Carlo method to estimate the likelihood of
affirming or overturning. Briefly, the Monte Carlo method is a statistical

46. See Appendix for a complete list of the Supreme Court panels by year.
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method that relies on probability distributions to obtain numerical results and
estimate the real-world probability of an event occurring. 47 in the present
study, this method involves creating 10,000 hypothetical Supreme Court
votes per case, using nine Justices with the probabilities assigned according
to the assumptions of each model. Each Court's vote is then assigned a 1 or
a 0. A 1 is assigned if there are more than five votes to uphold Roe v. Wade,
and a 0 if there are fewer. The mean for all 10,000 runs is then used as an
estimate of the real-world probability that a panel made up of those nine
Justices would uphold (or reinstate) Roe.48
A.

The Role ofLoyalty: The Nomination Process and the Increased
PartisanDivide on the Court

1. The President and Loyalty.-The first set of models is focused
primarily on varying degrees of a Justice's perceived loyalty to the president
nominating the Justice (as tempered by Senate confirmation). This factor
reflects the assumption that the nominating president is trying to choose a
Justice who will uphold the president's own political values. Attitudinalists
have long sought to provide empirical proof that ideological values are the
primary driving force behind Justices' decision-making,4 9 and while the
magnitude of the effect found has varied widely and the studies themselves
are subject to methodological critiques, 0 many, if not most, constitutional
scholars today agree that ideology plays at least some role in a Justice's
decision-making process." Importantly, Chemerinsky, one of the major
proponents of term limits, counts himself in this camp5 2 and believes that

47. See Susan R. Poulter, Monte Carlo Simulationin EnvironmentalRisk Assessment-Science,
Policy and Legal Issues, 9 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENv'T 7, 7-9 (1998) (describing the use of

the Monte Carlo method in environmental risk assessment).
48. All statistics were run in MATLAB. All scripts run are on file with author Christopher
Sundby. Note that this scenario actually presents a binomial distribution with independent
probabilities. The results of the Monte Carlo model were confirmed using a Poisson Equation,
another method of estimating binomial distributions with varying probabilities, which returned
nearly identical results. Convergence was also checked by running several of the simulations with
100,000 trials, and nearly identical results were obtained, suggesting that 10,000 trials is sufficient
to estimate the actual probability.
49. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of US.

Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 557, 558 (1989) (discussing efforts made to
correlate Justices' policy preferences and values with their decisions on the Court).
50. See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 1, at 1739-44 (discussing the limitations of the attitudinal
model).
51. See, e.g., Wayne Batchis, ConstitutionalNihilism: PoliticalScience and the Deconstruction
of the Judiciary,6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 11 (2008) ("Yet, even the most accomplished of

jurists openly acknowledge that judicial decisions, while primarily rooted in traditional legal
analysis, must involve some consideration of external factors.").
52. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 309 ("Ideology often matters enormously in how the Court
decides cases, so let's have a confirmation process that recognizes this.").
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presidents and senators weigh a Justice's ideology heavily in the nomination
and confirmation process.5 3 It therefore seems fair to evaluate the proposal
using its own assumptions: that ideology plays an important role in a Justice's
decision-making, that presidents consider ideology in their nomination
decisions, and that a correlation exists between the president's and Senate's
preferred outcomes and the likelihood of the Justice ruling the same way (at
least for politically salient issues).54
At least one empirical study has attempted to quantify the decisions of
individual Justices on a normalized scale ranging from liberal to
conservative." While this study did not directly measure the correlation
between a nominating president's preferences and the outcomes of the
Justice's decisions, the results are at least suggestive of a correlation between
the nominating president's party and the Justice's performance on the court;
the two most conservative Justices were appointed by Republicans and two
of the three most liberal Justices were appointed by Democrats.56
And while notable examples exist of Justices going against the
nominating president's ideology," the more recent trend is toward
conformity: the Court increasingly votes along ideological lines that are
predictable and closely aligned with the views and preferences of political
parties." Importantly, political science measurements of the ideology of the
Justices have found increasing alignment between partisan political divisions
and the Court's conservative-liberal split and a greater homogeneity in the
ideology of Justices nominated by the same party." An empirical study by

53. Id. at 308-09.
54. Id. at 309.
55. See, e.g., Segal & Cover, supra note 49, at 560 tbl.1 (rating the Supreme Court Justices
from Earl Warren to Anthony Kennedy on a scale from -1 (extremely conservative) to +1
(extremely liberal) and measuring the percent of "liberal" votes in civil liberty cases).
56. Id. at 599-60 tbl.l.
57. See, e.g., Todd S. Purdum, Presidents, PickingJustices, Can Have Backfires, N.Y. TIMES
(July 5, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/05/politics/politicsspeciall/presidents-picking[https://perma.cc/4RJC-USL7] (noting several presidents'
justices-can-have-backfires.html
discontent with their appointments, including President Roosevelt stating that he could "carve out
of a banana a judge with more backbone than that" after Justice Holmes ruled against him in an
antitrust case and President Eisenhower describing his appointment of Chief Justice Warren as
"[t]he biggest damn fool mistake I ever made").
58. Devins & Baum, supra note 7, at 301; see also Epstein & Posner, supra note 7 (discussing
the growing consistency between how Justices vote and the political ideology of the president who
appointed them).
59. Interestingly, however, the conservative-liberal divide has not similarly grown despite its
increased alignment with partisan political divisions. See Tom S. Clark, Measuring Ideological
Polarizationon the United States Supreme Court, 62 POL. REs. Q. 146, 146, 150 (2009) (discussing
the trend of ideological polarization over time as it relates to the Court); Devins & Baum, supra
note 7, at 319 (finding a reduction in the standard deviation in the number of conservative votes
among Justices appointed by presidents from each party, a measure of conformity); Donald Michael
Gooch, Ideological Polarization on the Supreme Court: Trends in the Court's Institutional
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Neal Devins and Lawrence Baum discovered an increased linkage between
party and ideology since 2010, a linkage they theorize is driven, in part, by
increased polarization among political elites, partisan sorting, and growing
awareness, acceptance, and perhaps even an embracing of this linkage by
nominators and Justices.6 0
While this acceptance and the role of political elites can most explicitly
be seen in President Trump's campaign promise that his nominees would be
picked by the Federalist Society,61 the leveraging of political networks to
nominate judges and influence the judiciary has been a long-term strategy of
the right.62 Devins and Baum found that when Justices are arranged from
liberal to conservative according to their Martin-Quinn scores from 1937 (the
first year for which Martin-Quinn scores are available) to the present, only
once prior to 2010 was the Court cleanly divided by the party of Justices'
nominators, and that was when seven Justices had been nominated not only
by a president of the same party, but by the same president, Franklin Delano
Roosevelt.6 3 For every term since Elena Kagan joined the Court in 2010,
however, there has been perfect alignment between the political party of the
nominating president and where the Justices fall on the liberal to conservative
Martin-Quinn spectrum.64 The lack of partisan divide prior to 2010 is also
apparent in voting behavior. Remarkably, from 1937 to 2010, in only one of
the three hundred twenty-two cases with at least two dissents that are listed
as "important" by the Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court did the majority and
dissenting Justices divide solely along the lines of the party of their
nominating president.65 Since 2010, by contrast, at least seven of the Guide's
"important" decisions have been decided strictly along those party lines.66

Environment and Across Regimes, 1937-2008,43 AM. POL. RES. 999, 1002-06 (2015) (discussing
Court polarization and how it relates to congressional and presidential polarization).
60. Devins & Baum, supra note 7, at 303-04.
61. Laurence Baum & Neal Devins, How the FederalistSociety Became the De FactoSelector
of Republican Supreme Court Justices, SLATE (Jan. 31, 2017, 10:12 AM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news-andpolitics/jurisprudence/2017/01/how the federalist societybecame the de
facto selector of republicansupreme.html [https://perma.cc/6S42-RNVK].
62. See, e.g., AMANDA

HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST

SOCIETY AND THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION 21-22 (2015) (discussing the Federalist
Society's institutional goal of implementing conservative and libertarian principles in legal
decisions).
63. Devins & Baum, supra note 7, at 309, 313-17 (analyzing the relationship between MartinQuinn scores, the party of the nominating president, and dissent and voting behavior in landmark
decisions).
64. Id. at 301.
65. Id. at 316.
66. Id. at 316-17. There are three obvious hypotheses for the increased alignment of a Justice's
voting with the party of the president that nominated him or her: (1) Nominators have only recently
begun trying harder to nominate judges whose decisions align with their political beliefs,
(2) nominators have gotten significantly better at selecting judges who actually will vote in line with
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While the Court did not often divide along partisan lines until 2010, an
increasing correlation between the party of the nominating president and the
relative conservatism or liberalism of the Justices was evident even before
that date.67 Jeffrey Segal, Richard Timpone, and Robert Howard comparedfrom Presidents Franklin Roosevelt through Bill Clinton-the nominating
president's rated liberalism in civil liberties and economics and their
appointed Justices' behavior in these domains. They found a significant
correlation in both. In the civil liberty domain, Justices voted liberally in
4.22% more cases for every ten points that their nominating president was
rated "more liberal" by presidential scholars, and 3.41% in the economic
domain." According to their model, the presidents' ratings could explain
between 20% and 34% of the Justices' voting behavior in these domains.6 9
For example, a Justice nominated by President Lyndon Johnson would be
expected to vote liberally in about 28% more civil liberty cases than a Justice
appointed by President Ronald Reagan, and a Justice nominated by President
Franklin Roosevelt would be expected to vote liberally in about 22% more
economic cases than a Justice appointed by President Ronald Reagan.70
Our models capture partisan alignment between a Justice and the
nominating president by including a variable for "loyalty," and, as we explain
in more detail later, we ran the data using three different levels: moderately
loyal, more loyal, and less loyal.
2. Senate Composition and Loyalty.-Of course, even if presidents are
choosing more extreme candidates or are more successful in choosing ones
aligned with their preferred ideology, Justices must still be confirmed by the
Senate. In other words, a Democratic president would like to appoint a Justice
who would uphold Roe v. Wade 100% of the time, but his ability to do so is
constrained by both the unpredictability of the Justice (loyalty level) and the
composition of the Senate. The inverse is true for Republican presidents. The
stronger the opposing party's presence in the Senate, the more the president
must temper his or her preferences to get the Justice confirmed.

the nominator's political preferences, or (3) judges have become more predictable, due to partisan

considerations or otherwise, in their voting behavior.
67. One study, for instance, found a reduction in the standard deviation, a measure of
variability, across time in the number of conservative votes when the Justices are grouped by the
party of their nominating president. This is due, at least in part, to changes in the nomination
behavior of presidents. Segal & Cover, supra note 49, at 561.
68. Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Buyer Beware? Presidential Success Through Supreme Court

Appointments, 53 POL. RES. Q. 557, 563-64 (2000).
69. Id. at 564 tbl.2.
70. Id. This number is calculated by comparing the most and least liberal president in each
domain, taking the difference divided by 10 and then multiplied by 4.22 and 3.41 respectively.
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One of the most prominent theories of Senate influence on the
confirmation process is the move-the-median (MTM) model. This theory
posits that both the president and the Senate have ideal ideological set points
to which each party wants to get as close to as possible." If the ideology of
the nominee is further from a senator's set point than is the status quo, she
should vote against the nominee. If the same is true for forty-one senators
(assuming the possibility of filibuster still exists), the nominee should not be
confirmed and the president must put forward a nominee closer to the
Senate's set point-even if the nominee is further from the president's
preferred set point.7 2 Recent empirical testing of the MTM model, however,
suggests that presidents have been far less constrained by the Senate than this
theory would suggest, with the Senate often confirming nominees whom the
theory suggests should have been rejected.7 3 Another study similarly found
that a Justice moves towards the president's ideological preference even
following what should have been a contested nomination.74 For this reason,
our study weights Justices as always being at least slightly loyal to the
president's ideology no matter the composition of the Senate.
But recent history makes evident that the Senate can have-and has
had-a profound impact on nominations in key, even if isolated, moments,
most notably in refusing to consider the nomination of Merrick Garland.
Furthermore, regardless of whether the Senate's influence on Supreme Court
nominees is supported empirically, the public and political actors view the
Senate's influence as very real and powerful. The starkest illustration of this
is the recent use of the "nuclear option" by the Democrats to eliminate the
filibuster for lower court nominees75 and then by the Republicans to confirm
Justice Gorsuch to the Supreme Court after the Democrats threatened to
filibuster his nomination.7 6
The confirmation process may also be fundamentally changing as the
ideological separation between the parties reaches unprecedented levels.
According to the National Journal Vote Rankings, in 2013 only two House
Republicans (both from New York) were more liberal than the two most

71. Charles M. Cameron & Jonathan P. Kastellec, Are Supreme Court Nominations a Movethe-Median Game?, 110 AM. POL. Sc REv. 778, 778 (2016).
72. Id. at 778.
73. Id.
74. David Cottrell et al., The Power to Appoint: PresidentialNominations and Change on the
Supreme Court, 81 J. POL. 1057, 1057-58 (2019).
75. Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger 'Nuclear' Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters on
Nominees, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poisedto-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21
/d065cfe8-52b6-1 1e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html [https://perma.cc/T6TZ-SEN4].
76. Ashley Killough & Ted Barrett, Senate GOP TriggersNuclear Option to Break Democratic
Filibusteron Gorsuch, CNN (Apr. 7, 2017, 9:26 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/06/politics
/senate-nuclear-option-neil-gorsuch/index.html [https://perma.cc/9MCL-6JKM].
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conservative Democrats; in the Senate, every Democrat had a more liberal
voting record than every Republican and vice versa.77 According to DWNominate Scores-a measurement of an individual congressman's ideology
calculated from his or her voting behavior-the ideological divide between
the parties is the widest since Reconstruction. 78 More importantly for this
study's purposes, this trend towards separation, which started in the early
1950s, has greatly accelerated since 1975,79 largely driven by a disappearance
of moderates in both parties.o This is of particular relevance to the
nomination process, because moderates are likely to be the difference
between a confirmation and a filibuster." This can be seen in a marked
decrease in the percentage of confirmations, an increase in the time before
confirmation, and an increase in partisan voting patterns on nominees.82 The
Justices seem very aware of the shift as well, with Chief Justice Roberts
recently stating that neither Justice Scalia nor Justice Ginsburg would be
confirmed today.83
Reflecting the view that the Senate has a significant influence on the
president's choice of nominee, Models 1-5 all build in a relatively strong role
for the Senate in the nomination process. Under these models, a president is
most likely to get a strong ideologically loyal nominee when the president's
party has a supermajority. This probability decreases by 10% if the
president's party is the majority party but lacks a supermajority, by 15% if
the Senate is even, by 20% if the opposing party controls the Senate but lacks
a supermajority, and by 30% if the opposing party has a supermajority. The
possibility that the role of the Senate is overstated or diminishing-especially

-

77. National Journal Vote Ratings, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/NationalJournal
vote ratings [https://perma.cc/8J5S-F9ZR] (last updated July 2014) (only counting congressional
members for which there was a sufficient voting record to calculate a score); Josh Kraushaar, The
Most Polarized Congress Ever: 2013 Congressional Vote Ratings, ATLANTIC (Feb. 6, 2014),
20 3
1
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/02/the-most-polarized-congress-evercongressional-vote-ratings/283635/ [https://perma.cc/KJL3-M7EL].
78. The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTEVIEW (Mar. 21, 2015), https://
[https://perma.cc/7LH4-NAP4]; Drew
legacy.voteview.com/political-polarization_2014.htm
Desilver, The PolarizedCongressof Today Has Its Roots in the 1970s, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/12/polarized-politics-in2014),
12,
(June
[https://perma.cc/A6MScongress-began-in-the-I 970s-and-has-been-getting-worse-ever-since/
MVU6].
79. See The Polarizationof the CongressionalParties,supra note 78. This effect appears to be
driven primarily, though not entirely, by a stark move to the right by the most liberal 10% of the
Republican party starting in 1981.
80. Id. Moderates now make up less than 5% of Congress, a drastic drop from 40% in 1980.
81. A.E. Dick Howard, The ChangingFace of the Supreme Court, 101 VA. L. REV. 231, 315
(2015).
82. Id. at 296-316.
83. Brent Martin, ChiefJusticeRoberts: Scalia, Ginsburg Wouldn't Be Confirmed Today, NEB.
http://
Roberts),
Chief Justice
(quoting
2014)
19,
(Sept.
RADIO NETWORK
nebraskaradionetwork.com/2014/09/19/chief-justice-roberts-scalia-ginsburg-wouldnt-beconfirmed-today-audio [https://perma.cc/RQ6Z-MRT4].
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if the filibuster is permanently abolished-is addressed later in Models 6
and 7.
The Effects ofLoyalty on Legal Stability in a Term-Limit Regime
The first three models explore the effects of changes to the level of
stability based on varying degrees of judicial "loyalty." A Democratic
president is assumed to want to nominate a Justice strongly in favor of
upholding Roe v. Wade, while a Republican president is presumed to want a
Justice who will favor overturning it. The models simulate moderately loyal,
more loyal, and less loyal Justices. The more loyal a Justice is, the more likely
he or she is to vote according to the preferences of the nominating president.
The model posits that more loyal Justices are 10% more likely to vote in
accordance with their nominating party's preference than moderately loyal
Justices. In turn, less loyal Justices are 10% less likely to vote in accordance
with their nominating party's preferences than their moderately loyal
counterparts.
Before delving into the results of the models, it is important to note the
shortcomings of the probabilities assigned to each Justice. While the exact
values for these numbers have not been quantitatively derived, the study
attempts to account for the arbitrariness of the exact numbers, if not their
general direction, by presenting three different models with varying loyalty
levels. While the robustness of the effect varies, the total number of precedent
switches is consistent across all three loyalty levels. This suggests that the
findings of this study are robust over a range of correlation strengths between
the ideologies at work in the nomination process and the Justice's decisions.
Future studies, however, should examine the minimum correlation needed to
produce the precedential reversals found in this study.
B.

1. The Moderately Loyal Justices Model (Model 1).-Table 1
summarizes the probabilities assigned to each Justice based on the party of
the nominating president, the composition of the Senate, and a moderately
loyal Justice. Briefly, a Justice nominated by a Democratic president with a
Democratic supermajority8 4 in the Senate was assigned an 85% probability
of voting to uphold Roe; a Democratic president with a Democratic majority
in the Senate a 75% probability of voting to uphold; a Democratic president
with a Republican majority in the Senate a 65% probability of voting to
uphold; and a Democratic president with a Republican supermajority in the

84. A "supermajority" is defined as a filibuster-proof majority, or at least sixty senators. This
distinction may be less important in the future, as the Senate has abandoned the filibuster for
Supreme Court nominees (and Court of Appeals nominees). However, a supermajority might still
strengthen a president's bargaining position and facilitate confirmation of a more loyal candidate.
It is also possible, of course, that the Senate might decide to reinstate the filibuster at some point in
the future. The effects of eliminating the filibuster are explored in Model 7.

Term Limits and Turmoil

2019]

139

Senate a 55% probability of voting to uphold. Justices nominated by
Republican presidents were assigned probabilities in the same fashion but in
reverse: a Republican president with a Democratic supermajority in the
Senate was assigned a 45% probability of voting to uphold Roe; a Republican
president with a Democratic majority in the Senate a 35% probability of
voting to uphold; a Republican president with a Republican majority in the
Senate a 25% probability of voting to uphold; a Republican president with a
Republican supermajority in the Senate a 15% probability of voting to
uphold; and a Republican president with an evenly divided Senate (as in
2001)" a 30% probability of voting to uphold.
Moderate Loyal Justices

Ukelihood
President

Senate

D
D
D
D
R
R
R
R
R

DD
D
R
RR
DD
D
R
RR
Even

Justice Votes to
Uphold
85
75
65
55
45
35
25
15
30

Table 1. This table displays the likelihood of a moderately loyal Justice voting to uphold Roe v.
Wade depending on the party of the president and the composition of the Senate ("D" = Democrat,
"R"= Republican, "DD" =

60 Democrats, "RR" =

60 Republicans).

As Figure 1 below shows, even for moderately loyal Justices the results
are striking: Roe v. Wade would very likely suffer legal whiplash. A greater
than 70% chance exists that Roe would be overturned in 1987 (and an 87%
chance in 1989), a 65% chance that Roe would then be reinstatedin 2009,
and a 55% chance that it would be re-overturned in 2017 following the
Republicans winning the White House. In other words, a term-limit system
85. While the vice president breaks such a tie (making this group functionally the same as
R-R), this group was included because it still suggests a weaker presidential bargaining position,
which may slightly temper whom the president will nominate. Also note that all models base
chamber composition on the day the Senate gavels into session, on the assumption that the president
will make his nomination soon thereafter (this is important for instances where senators switched
parties or had to be replaced over the course of a session). No calculations were done for a
Democratic president and an evenly divided Senate because that configuration did not occur
between 1975 and 2019.
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could have dramatic implications for the Court's zigzagging, with the Court's
stance on Roe reversing three times in only forty-six years.1 6
Odds of OverturningRoe v. Wade with ModeratelyLoyal Justices

I

I

I

I

I

I

Figure 1. The odds of the Supreme Court overturning Roe v. Wade between 1973 and 2019 with
moderately loyal Justices. The horizontal line marks the cutoff between the Court being more or
less likely to overturn Roe v. Wade.

One might, of course, disagree with our assessment of judicial loyalty,
in either direction. Critics of term limits might argue that Justices are actually
far more likely to vote in line with the preferences of their nominating
president, or be more "loyal." Proponents of term limits might argue that the
values are far too high and Justices in practice are far less "loyal." Models 2
and 3 address these scenarios.
2. The More Loyal Justices Model (Model 2).-Table 2 below
summarizes the probabilities assigned to each Justice based on an assumption
that Justices are likely to be more loyal to their nominating president than in
the previous model. These more loyal Justices are defined as being 10% more
likely to vote in line with their nominating president's preferences than their
moderately loyal counterparts.

86. Some, however, may not find this degree of instability unsettling. Proponents could decide
that the loss in stability and predictability in constitutional precedent is outweighed by the benefits
of a more majoritarian and responsive Supreme Court. This Essay does not attempt to weigh in on
this normative debate, but merely provides a more complete understanding of the potential costs.

Term Limits and Turmoil

2019]

141

igh LoyaltyJustices
Ukelihood

President

Senate

Justice Votes to

Uphold
D
D
D
D
R
R
R
R
R

DD
D
R
RR
DD
D
R
RR
Even

95
85
75
65
35
25
15
5
20

Table 2. This table displays the likelihood of a more loyal Justice voting to uphold Roe v. Wade
depending on the party of the president and the composition of the Senate ("D" = Democrat, "R" =
Republican, "DD"= 60 Democrats, "RR"= 2 60 Republicans). More loyal judges are considered
10% more likely to vote in line with the preferences of their nominating president than moderately
loyal judges.

Figure 2 below shows that, at first glance, whether one posits a
moderately loyal or more loyal Justice, the superficial results are remarkably
similar; the precedent switches the same number of times over the same time
span, and even in the same years. Yet an important difference arises in the
overall likelihood that the Court's decisions will in fact change.87 Indeed,
between just 1983 and 1985 with the addition of the more loyal Justice, the
Court rises from a 14% probability of overturning Roe to a 62% probability
of overturning. By comparison, with the moderately loyal condition the
largest change in probability in any two years was only 35%, suggesting a
more limited chance of actual reversal.

87. In the high-loyalty condition, the possibility of overruling existing precedent comes within
10% of a coin flip only once over the course of forty-six years, versus eleven times in the moderately
loyal condition.
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Odds of OverturningRoe v. Wade with More Loyal Justices

Figure2. The odds of the Supreme Court overturning Roe v. Wade between 1973 and 2019 with
more loyal Justices. The horizontal line marks the cutoff between the Court being more or less likely
to overturn Roe v. Wade.

In other words, while the precedent switches an equal number of times
(three) for each model, the swings are much more extreme, and the likelihood
of reversal is much more certain under the high-loyalty model. The
magnitude of these swings could fundamentally change how jurisprudence
evolves or the likelihood that the Court chooses to grant cert. for any given
case. In general, constitutional law, like common law, is thought to evolve
slowly through small, deliberate steps rather than rapid sea changes." In the
high-loyalty condition, however, these incremental changes might be
bypassed, and the law could be subject to rapid, jolting swings.
3. The Less Loyal Justices Model (Model 3).-Table 3 below
summarizes the probabilities assigned to each Justice assuming less loyalty.
Less loyal Justices are defined as being 10% less likely to vote in line with
their nominating president's preferences than moderately loyal Justices and
20% less likely than their most loyal counterparts.

88. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 63-69 (discussing the merits of minimalism and how
jurisprudence evolves).
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L w Loyalty Justices
Likelihood
President

Senate

D

DD

75

D

D

65

D
D

R
RR

55
51

R
R
R
R
R

DD
D
R
RR
Even

49
45
35
25
30

Justice Votes to

Uphold

Table 3. This table displays the likelihood of a less loyal Justice voting to uphold Roe v. Wade
depending on the party of the president and the composition of the Senate ("D" = Democrat, "R" =
Republican, "DD" = > 60 Democrats, "RR"= 60 Republicans). Less loyal judges are considered
10% less likely to vote in line with the preferences of their nominating president than moderately
loyal judges.

As Figure 3 shows, positing low-loyalty Justices appears to ameliorate,
but not eliminate, the potential instability created by term limits. The model
predicts the same three swings in precedent, with the last one (re-overruling
the reinstated Roe) following President Trump's second nominee during his
first term. Perhaps importantly, the Court's shifts are, however, much more
gradual, with the likelihood of a switch within 10% of a coin flip for thirteen
of the twenty-three hypothetical cases. This arguably is within a range that
would not discourage litigants from bringing cases and within a range that
one could foresee a Justice switching his or her views over time or even being
swayed by particularly good lawyering.89 The gradual nature of the swings
might also help keep litigants focused on the case law as their guide rather
than solely the composition of the Court. Nevertheless, the fact that the same
swings occur under this model helps to confirm the robustness of the overall
conclusion that term limits are likely to increase doctrinal instability.

89. A recent empirical study has found that lawyer quality can make a difference in Supreme
Court decisions. Michael J. Nelson & Lee Epstein, Lawyers with More Experience Obtain Better
Outcomes 7 (May 14, 2019) (working paper), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/LawyerExp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YJF8-YKCM].
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Odds of OverturningRoe v. Wade with Less Loyal Justices
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Figure 3. The odds of the Supreme Court overturning Roe v. Wade between 1973 and 2019 with
less loyal Justices. The horizontal line marks the cutoff between the Court being more or less likely
to overturn Roe v. Wade.

4. Summary: Loyalty and Term Limits.-The results of these three
models illustrate the likely instability that would occur under a term-limit
regime if Justices exhibit any decision-making loyalty at all towards their
nominating president's views. Even small degrees of loyalty, or ideological
alignment, between a president and his or her chosen Justice can introduce
substantial doctrinal instability in a term-limit system. Perhaps most
surprising, as Figure 4 shows, the degree of alignment doesn't appear to have
a large effect on the net number of swings, but the more aligned a Justice is,
the sharper the swings and the more certainty there is that a reversal will
occur in any given year. This difference may manifest itself in how opinions
are written or whether to grant cert., and may leave more or less room for the
impact of good lawyering in determining a case outcome. It also means that
ideological drift (not accounted for in our model) could have a far more
substantial impact on case outcomes under the less loyal model because the
median Justice would be less ideologically rigid."o

90. While only three "loyalty" values are presented in the main text, simulations were run
assuming values ranging from 1%-100% loyalty and are available from author Christopher Sundby.
Results are very similar at levels down to 65% (three precedent changes that have probabilities of
55% or above). Below that level, the probabilities resemble a coin flip, with changes predicted very
frequently but at a low level (less than 55%) of probability.
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Odds of OverturningRoe v. Wade with Varying Degrees ofJustice Loyalty

Figure4. The odds of the Supreme Court overturning Roe v. Wade between 1973 and 2019 with
either moderately, less, or more loyal Justices. In all three cases the same horizontal line marks the
cutoff between the Court being more or less likely to overturn Roe v. Wade.

The loyalty models, while considering one potentially critical factor in
how the Court decides cases, do not account for a potential source of doctrinal
stability: stare decisis. This factor is addressed in Models 4 and 5.
C.

Stare Decisis and Term Limits

Models 4 and 5 are based on each Justice's deference to precedent.
These "stare decisis" models explore the possible role of deference to
precedent in providing stability to the system. In the words of Justice Kagan
in Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, "[stare decisis] promotes the
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles,
fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and
perceived integrity of the judicial process." 92 Stare decisis is thus a strong
candidate to temper the potential swings in doctrine caused by frequent
changes in the Court's ideological preferences brought on by a more frequent
change in the Court's composition.
It is admittedly difficult to quantify the role that stare decisis plays in
judicial decisions. Some Justices may pay lip service to stare decisis in their
opinions but actually give it little weight in their deliberative process. Still
others may defer strongly to precedent in practice but not feel the need to
espouse its virtues and therefore leave its role unstated. Some studies have
endeavored to quantify the role that precedent plays in the Justices' decisions.

91. 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015).
92. Id. at 2409 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991)).
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Bailey and Maltzman, for example, used the policy preferences of members
of Congress and the president to calculate policy cut-points on Supreme
Court cases which they could then use as a control for the role of policy in
the decision and better isolate the role of legal factors such as deference to
precedent and deference to Congress.9 3 They found a significant role for
deference to precedent in thirteen of the sixteen Justices examined, but very
high variability among Justices.94 Given such high variability, it is
challenging to compute its effect on the Court as a whole and may change
drastically from one Court to another depending on composition.
But while the precise role of stare decisis may be difficult to capture, we
can at least gain a sense of how individual Justices' views on the importance
(or lack of importance) of stare decisis might play out in a term-limited
regime. For that limited purpose, we can envision three possibilities: no
deference, weak deference, and strong deference.95 Models 1 through 3,
already discussed, function without accounting for an individual Justice's
deference to precedent, and can thus serve as the equivalent of no deference.
The following models present two other possibilities: a moderate version,
which assumes weak deference (Model 4), and a model with strong deference
(Model 5). Both the weak-deference and strong-deference models use
moderately loyal Justices to explore the possible stabilizing effects of stare
decisis within a term-limit system. Under the models, a Justice with weak
deference is 5% less likely to vote against precedent, and a Justice with strong
deference is 10% less likely to vote against precedent-both compared to
moderately loyal peers who do not account for precedent at all. By examining
both ends and the middle of the spectrum, we can gain a sense of how
Justices' views on the role of precedent might play out.
1. The Weak Deference to Precedent Model (Model 4).-The weak
deference to precedent model uses the probabilities of moderately loyal
Justices and discounts their likelihood of voting against precedent by 5%.96
Thus, if Roe is in effect, the Justices appointed by a Republican president are
5% less likely to vote to overturn it, and Justices appointed by a Democratic
president are 5% more likely to uphold it. The reverse is true during periods

93. See Michael A. Bailey & Forrest Maltzman, Does Legal DoctrineMatter? Unpacking Law
and Policy Preferenceson the U.S. Supreme Court, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 369 (2008) (attempting
to disentangle the influence of law and ideological preferences in Supreme Court decisions).
94. Id. at 379 fig.5 (finding a high degree of variation in the weight given to precedent between
Justices).
95. While only three simulations are presented, simulations with deference from 0%-100% for
each loyalty value from 0%-100% were run and are available from author Christopher Sundby.
Once the deference level reaches 15% there are almost no reversals at any level of loyalty. We
discuss this finding infra at text accompanying note 109.
96. Any decision between 45% and 55% was not counted as sufficiently likely to swing the
weight of precedent.
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when Roe has been overruled: Justices appointed by a Democratic president
are 5% less likely to vote to reinstate it, and Justices appointed by a
Republican president are 5% more likely to vote against reinstating it. As
shown in Figure 5, even a weak adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis
appears to ameliorate some of the instability caused by term limits. Indeed,
between 1973 and the present day, Roe v. Wade would be overturned, but
that would be the only precedent switch over the period (compared to three
switches if no effect of stare decisis is factored into the probabilities). The
weak-deference model, however, does have unstable aspects: Between 2009
and 2015, the Court is very near coin-flip odds of confirming or overturning,
always within 10% of an even chance. Furthermore, if a Democrat had won
the 2016 presidential election, regardless of the outcome of the Senate race,9 7
precedent would have swung for a second time, and Roe would have been
reinstated. Nonetheless, an adherence to stare decisis, even a weak one, does
insert some degree of stability into the model.
Odds of OverturningRoe v. Wade with Moderately Loyal Justices with
Weak Deference to Precedent
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Figure 5. The odds of the Supreme Court overturning Roe v. Wade between 1973 and 2019 with
moderately loyal Justices exhibiting a 5% deference to precedent. The horizontal line marks the
cutoff between the Court being more or less likely to overturn Roe v. Wade. The solid line represents
the predicted results with President Trump's two nominees and the dashed line, predicting a
reinstatement of Roe in 2019, represents the predicted results had the Democrats won the 2016
presidential election.

97. Assuming neither party had won a supermajority in the Senate, which was not simulated
between 2015 and 2019 in the model.
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2. The Strong Deference to PrecedentModel (Model 5).-The strong
deference to precedent model also uses the probabilities of moderately loyal
Justices and discounts their likelihood of voting against precedent by 10%.98
Similar to the high-loyalty model, an assumption of strong deference to
precedent produces higher probabilities of either upholding or reversing, and
thus more certainty. As seen in Figure 6, a strong deference to precedent
results in ten years with less than a 5% chance of overturning Roe. After that
point, however, the odds swing dramatically in the other direction. As the
composition of the Court changes with a new Justice every two years, there
is a twenty-year period with over a 70% probability of overturning or not
reinstating Roe v. Wade. This high probability results because once a
precedent switch occurs, even Justices who, based on their loyalty
preference, would otherwise vote against the reigning precedent are now 10%
less likely to do so. Additionally, those Justices who are already inclined to
vote in the same direction as the reigning precedent are even more likely to
do so, making a reversal even less likely. The changes over any two-year
period, however, are significantly less than those in the high-loyalty (no
deference) condition, with a largest change of 31%, as opposed to 48%.99
While a strong deference to precedent clearly increases stability, it's a close
call: If the Democrats had taken both the White House and the Senate in 2016
and eliminated the filibuster, Roe would have been reinstated when the
Democratic president appointed her second Justice in 2019.

98. Once again, any decision between 45% and 55% was not counted as sufficiently likely to
swing the weight of precedent.
99. Compare Figure 2 with Figure 6.
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Odds of OverturningRoe v. Wade with Moderately Loyal Justices with
Strong Deference to Precedent
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Figure 6. The odds of the Supreme Court overturning Roe v. Wade between 1973 and 2019 with
moderately loyal Justices exhibiting a 10% deference to precedent. The horizontal line marks the
cutoff between the Court being more or less likely to overturn Roe v. Wade.

3. Summary: Stare Decisis and Term Limits.-Deference to precedent,
not surprisingly, appears to bring substantial doctrinal stability to a term-limit
system. Even a weak deference to precedent reduces the number of predicted
switches of Roe from three to one, though the Court is only one unexpected
2016-election result away from a predicted second switch.R" In a weak
deference to precedent system, however, six of the twenty-three hypothetical
cases are within 10% of a coin flip (compared to only one in the strongdeference model), suggesting that weak deference creates an underlying level
of instability in a term-limited regime. This could have important
implications for whether cases are brought at all and, if brought, how they
are argued.
Too strong a deference to precedent, however, can also cement a
precedent in place to such an extent that it effectively negates the advantages
of a term-limit system. For example, a deference to precedent of only 15%
(the strong-deference model uses 10%) under our models would never predict
a reversal of Roe v. Wade,"o' despite thirteen Republican appointees to the
Court and only ten for Democrats. In other words, precedent does appear to
bring doctrinal stability to a term-limit system, but at the potential cost of the

100. As noted earlier, to trigger a second precedent swing in the strong deference to precedent
model, it would have taken the Democrats winning both the White House and a majority in the
Senate, plus the elimination of the filibuster (or a Democratic supermajority in support of a
Democratic president).
101. Model on file with author Christopher Sundby.
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very democratic responsiveness that makes term limits appealing to many
proponents.
Furthermore, it is possible that precedent would function differently in
a term-limit system in a way that weakens its constraining force. Precedent
usually operates on lower courts through willing compliance because fewer
than 1% of lower court decisions are heard and overturned by the Supreme
Court. 102 Chad Westerland and his colleagues suggest that the persuasiveness
of Supreme Court precedent on lower courts is not constant, varying greatly
with how ideologically estranged lower courts view the current Supreme
Court from the Supreme Court that created the precedent.1 03 Under a
principal-agent conceptualization of Supreme Court precedent, precedent
would have limited utility in stabilizing doctrine because a lower court is
more willing to defy Supreme Court precedent if it views the current Court
as ideologically distinct from the precedent-creating Court, which could
happen with more frequency and more quickly in a term-limit system."
Furthermore, several prominent originalists, including Justice Scalia, have
argued that precedent for constitutional questions is less important than in
other cases, which further cabins precedent's potential as a counterweight
against instability in a term-limit system.10 5
D.

Senate Influence and Stability in a Term-Limit System

As discussed earlier, the Senate's level of influence in the nomination
process is a hotly contested theoretical and empirical issue."0 6 Our models all
assume a reasonably strong influence; a president appointing a moderately
loyal Justice facing a simple majority of the opposing party in the Senate
never has more than a 75% probability that his or her nominee will vote the
desired way. 107 What if the Senate has more or less influence than we posit?
The next three sections discuss that possibility.
1. Less Senate Influence (Not Necessary to Model Statistically).-If
the Senate has less influence than we posit, all our results will tilt toward

102. Chad Westerland et al., StrategicDefiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts ofAppeals,
54 AM. J. POL. Sci. 891, 892 (2010).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 825 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("A judge
looking at a constitutional decision may have compulsions to revere past history and accept what
was once written. But he remembers above all else that it is the Constitution which he swore to
support and defend, not the gloss which his predecessors may have put on it." (quoting William 0.
Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949))), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 1277 (1991); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 76-77 (2002).
106. See supra section II(A)(2) for a discussion of the research into the role of the Senate in the
confirmation process.
107. See supra Table 2.
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greater instability, because the likelihood of a president successfully
nominating an ideologically aligned Justice will increase: a president will be
able to get more loyal nominees, or nominees closer to his or her preferred
policy set point, confirmed.
2. The High Senate Influence Model (Model 6).-Another possibility
is that the Senate has more influence than our previous models assumed, or
that term limits may increase the influence it can exert on confirmation. To
address this possibility, Model 6 posits significantly stronger Senate
influence on the president's nominee than assumed in the earlier models. We
assume a moderately loyal Justice with weak deference to precedent (the
middle values for those variables) but assume that the Senate exerts 10%
more control when it is in opposition to the precedent. Thus, the probabilities
are the same as those assigned in Model 4 (moderately loyal Justices with
weak deference to precedent), but with a Senate controlled by the opposite
party able to exert 10% more influence than in Model 4. To illustrate, a
Justice nominated by a Democratic president with a Republican majority in
the Senate has a 55% probability of voting to uphold rather than a 65%
probability. If Roe is the current precedent at the time of the case this would
increase to 60%, and if it were overturned at the time of the case it would fall
to 50%. If the Senate is controlled by the president's party, however, nothing
should change from Model 4 because we are assuming that the president and
the Senate have similar desires when it comes to upholding, overruling, or
reinstating Roe."os Table 4 presents these probabilities graphically and
Figure 7 summarizes the results.

108. The only time this might vary is if the filibuster rule interacts with a strong Senate
influence to create a roadblock to the president getting his or her ideal nominee confirmed. As we
discussed in note 84, supra, this is not currently an issue. However, to account for the possibility,
we will decrease by 10% the probability of a nominee in that circumstance voting in the president's
direction (in other words, treating it just like a president facing a Senate controlled by the opposing

party).
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h Senate Influence
Ukelihood
President

Senate

D
D
D
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Justice Votes to
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85
75
55
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25
15
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Table 4. This table displays the likelihood of a moderately loyal Justice voting to uphold Roe v.
Wade with high Senate influence, depending on the party of the president and the composition of
the Senate ("D" = Democrat, "R" = Republican, "DD"

=

60 Democrats, "RR"

=

60

Republicans).

Odds of Overturning Roe v. Wade with Justices Confirmed with
High Senate Influence
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Figure 7. The odds of the Supreme Court overturning Roe v. Wade between 1973 and 2019 with
moderately loyal Justices and confirmed by a Senate with a lot of influence on the nominee. The
horizontal line marks the cutoff between the Court being more or less likely to overturn Roe v.
Wade.

As Figure 7 shows, positing increased Senate influence on the
confirmation process produces the same number of precedent swings as
Model 4, which assumed less Senate influence and the same moderately
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loyal, weakly deferential Justices. This model, however, does illustrate how
increased Senate influence could help temper the Court from swinging too
rapidly. For example, while in both the moderate and high Senate influence
models the odds of overturning Roe drop from 2007 to 2015 as President
Obama's appointees take the bench, in the high Senate influence model the
swing is less dramatic and his nominees are less able to swing the balance of
the Court than in the moderate-influence model. This might help prevent the
Court from swinging too far in either direction even if one party retains
control of the White House for multiple terms. On the other hand, it could
also lead to more contentious confirmation hearings and more visible
political fights between the president and the Senate, thereby defeating one
of the hoped-for benefits of a term-limit system.
3. The No Filibuster Model (Model 7).-Finally, we examine the
effects of the elimination of the filibuster. Although filibustering a nominee
was an option for the minority party during most of the period under
consideration, it has now been eliminated. Comparing what would have
happened to Roe had the filibuster been eliminated earlier with its fate with
the filibuster in place can both provide insights into the wisdom of
eliminating the filibuster and make the analysis more complete.
Model 7 uses the middle values for all three variables (moderate loyalty,
weak deference, and moderate Senate influence) but this time posits a Senate
lacking a filibuster option for the minority party. Essentially, the filibuster's
elimination is treated as raising the likelihood of confirmation to the same
level when the president's party has a simple majority in the Senate as when
it holds a supermajority. Table 5 displays the probabilities, Figure 8 presents
the results, and Figure 9 presents a comparison among moderate Senate
influence with a filibuster, moderate Senate influence without a filibuster,
and strong Senate influence with a filibuster.
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No Filibuster
Ukelihood
Senate
Justice Votes to
Uphold
DD
85
D
85
R
65
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55
DD
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35
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President
D
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R
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R

Table 5. This table displays the likelihood of a moderately loyal Justice confirmed by a Senate with
moderate influence but no filibuster option voting to uphold Roe v. Wade depending on the party of
the president and the composition of the Senate ("D" = Democrat, "R"= Republican, "DD"
60
Democrats, "RR" = 60 Republicans).
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Figure 8. The odds of the Supreme Court overturning Roe v. Wade between 1973 and 2019 with
moderately loyal Justices with weak deference to precedent and confirmed by a Senate without the
filibuster option. The horizontal line marks the cutoff between the Court being more or less likely
to overturn Roe v. Wade.
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Odds of OverturningRoe v. Wade with Varying Degrees
of Senate Influence
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Figure 9. The odds of the Supreme Court overturning Roe v. Wade between 1973 and 2019 with
moderately loyal Justices and confirmed by a Senate with high influence on the nominee (dotted
line) compared to moderately loyal justices confirmed by a Senate with either moderate influence
(solid line) or moderate influence and no ability to filibuster (dashed line). The horizontal line marks
the cutoff between the Court being more or less likely to overturn Roe v. Wade.

As shown in Figures 8 and 9, the elimination of the filibuster may be a
more symbolic than practical means of changing the Court and its ideological
makeup, as it does not change the number of precedent swings and indeed
produces results very close to those of a moderately influential Senate with
the filibuster in place. It is also worth noting that, if anything, the previous
models overstated the effects of a filibuster since the threat of a filibuster was
assumed to be omnipresent, rather than threatened for a specific nominee.
In isolated circumstances, however, eliminating the filibuster can have
a large effect on both a term-limit system and the present system, such as in
the case of President Trump's hypothetical second nominee or the real-world
nomination of Justice Kavanaugh. With the filibuster eliminated, the Justice
would increase the odds of the Court overruling Roe by 9%, compared to a
Justice nominated and confirmed by the same president and a Senate with the
ability to filibuster. Overall, our models suggest that if less Senate influence
is desired, eliminating the filibuster may be an effective way to achieve it,
since its elimination moves nominees slightly more towards the nominating
president.
The desirability of this outcome may depend on one's view of
democratic accountability, one of the main goals of term-limit proponents.
The president is the face of the party responsible for a future Justice, so
increasing his or her influence arguably increases democratic accountability
by making it clearer to the public that the president bears almost exclusive
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responsibility for the nominee-at least where the president's party controls
the Senate. However, because the Senate is also an elected body, in many
ways the democratic influence is simply being redirected rather than
increased.
III. Implications and Limitations
A.

Term Limits and the Rise ofDoctrinalInstability
Proposals for term limits for Supreme Court Justices have gained
renewed traction as a possible way to solve the countermajoritarian difficulty,
depoliticize the Court, and reinvigorate the Court's legitimacy. While not
discounting the possible benefits of term limits, this study has asked whether
a term-limit regime might also lead to greater legal instability. The study's
results reveal the proposal's substantial potential to destabilize important
constitutional precedents and to change the way that constitutional
jurisprudence evolves by pushing it away from gradual shifts and towards
more sudden jolts.
But how likely is it that term limits would in fact have such an effect?
Having explored a variety of options, we can now consider the most likely
scenario. As noted earlier, the trend seems to be toward nominating Justices
with a high degree of loyalty and little if any willingness to defer to
precedent.' 09 Assuming that we are accurate in assessing the Senate's
influence as moderate-especially given the current absence of a filibuster,
which does slightly decrease the Senate's influence-the model that best
captures these three variables (high loyalty, no deference, moderate Senate
influence) is Model 2, illustrated by Figure 2 on page 142 and reproduced
below for the convenience of the reader.1 10

109. One recent study supports our assessment of these variables. The study suggests that
presidential interest in the Court is increasing, the cost of finding ideologically reliable candidates
is decreasing, and that the composition of the Court is therefore swinging toward Justices whose
decisions reliably align with the politics of the nominating president. See Charles M. Cameron et
al., PresidentialSelection of Supreme Court Nominees: The CharacteristicsApproach, Q.J. POL.

SCI. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3-4), https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/jkastellec
/files/cameronkastellec-mattioli characteristics forweb_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8F5-54P2].
110. There are other combinations of loyalty and deference that also produce three swings. As
long as the level of deference is below 5%, the Court is likely to change its mind three times.
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Odds of OverturningRoe v. Wade with More Loyal Justices

Figure 2. The odds of the Supreme Court overturning Roe v. Wade between 1973 and 2019 with
more loyal Justices. The horizontal line marks the cutoff between the Court being more or less likely
to overturn Roe v. Wade.

This model has a substantial detrimental effect on doctrinal stability. A
term-limited Court not only changes its collective mind on abortion three

times in forty-six years, but also produces extreme swings with a high
likelihood of reversal. Such a level of constitutional zigzagging has never
been seen in the Court's history.
Such instability could produce a number of deleterious effects. The lack
of doctrinal stability might be replaced with a different type of predictability.
Even in the absence of the typical in-between cases signaling change,
outcomes may actually become more predictable. However, litigants would
turn to reading the tea leaves of the Court's composition rather than looking
to past precedent for guidance. This change also affects the time horizon of
predictability. A case can swing from a sure winner to a sure loser over the
course of a single election. This could have a drastic effect on litigants who
often have to wait years before their cases reach the Supreme Court and may
affect whether they decide to bring cases at all.
Perhaps most damaging, it is unclear how frequent swings would affect
enforcement of Supreme Court decisions as lower courts react to sudden
ideological changes in Court majorities. The lower courts' reactions might be

exacerbated by the fact that instability and doctrinal swings could also open
up a Pandora's box of retroactivity and legitimacy issues. In general, new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure "do not apply retroactively to cases
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on collateral review, but new substantive rules do.""' In Montgomery v.
Louisiana,112 the Court clarified that substantive constitutional rules include
"rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct."ll 3 If, for
example, either a woman or her doctor were to be criminally convicted under
a law banning abortion during an era when Roe v. Wade was not in effect,
this conviction should be overturned under Montgomery following Roe's
reinstatement. If the precedent is repeatedly overturned and reinstated,
however, lower courts and policy makers could decide to simply ignore the
Supreme Court's decision, counting on a reversal after subsequent elections.
In other words, the Supreme Court could lose perhaps its most valuable asset,
finality, which could result in increased defiance of its decisions and reduced
legitimacy.
B.

Limitations and FutureResearch

While the study finds a distinct danger that legal instability will be a
serious side effect of term limits, the study also signals possible ways to limit
the dangers of the proposal. The models support the proposition that Justices
who display less loyalty to the viewpoints of their nominating presidents
bring greater stability to the system than those who exhibit high fidelity to
their nominators. Similarly, the models support the idea that the appointment
of Justices with a greater fidelity to stare decisis breeds greater stability.
These results suggest that the wisdom of Supreme Court term limits depends
on the characteristics of the Justices appointed to the Court, pointing to an
important direction for future study. Studies hoping to shed light on the
practicality of term limits should attempt to measure the weight that Justices
give to precedent in their decision-making processes and the degree of loyalty
sitting Justices display towards their nominating presidents' ideologies.
These questions are not new, but this study highlights a renewed need to
explore them. Future studies should also attempt to discern the interaction
between precedent and loyalty. Importantly, proponents of term limits seem
to base their proposals on the assumption that Justices are very loyal. 114
Indeed, this assumption is one of the foundational motivations for wanting
each president to have an equal opportunity to nominate Justices. 1 s
It is also important as a qualifying note to observe that the precedential
swings predicted, even if the assumptions in the model and outcomes are
111. Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1259-60 (2016) (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 310 (1989); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004)).
112. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
113. Id. at 728 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989)).
114. CHEMERINSKY, supranote 4, at 309 ("Ideology often matters enormously in how the Court
decides cases, so let's have a confirmation process that recognizes this.").
115. See, e.g., id. at 311 ("Having a vacancy every two years would give all presidents the
chance to equally influence the Court.").
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entirely accurate, may not manifest themselves as outright swings in
precedent. Instead they should be viewed as a predicted era of support for, or
opposition to, the decision in question. This could manifest in a variety of
ways including case selection, a weakening of the precedent through
exceptions and qualifiers,116 as well as outright reversal. Furthermore, many
issues will not align as cleanly with politics as Roe v. Wade does. As thenSenator Obama once stated in voting against the confirmation of Chief
Justice Roberts:
[W]hile adherence to legal precedent and rules of statutory or
constitutional construction will dispose of 95 percent of the cases that
come before a court, so that both a Scalia and a Ginsburg will arrive
at the same place most of the time on those 95 percent of the caseswhat matters on the Supreme Court is those 5 percent of cases that are
truly difficult.117
While it may be true that only politically salient cases would trigger the
dramatic swings hypothesized by these models, that does not mean that
substantial shifts in the Court's overall jurisprudence would not occur during
these periods on lower profile issues that still have significant ramifications
for our constitutional system of government, including issues such as
immunity of government actors or the breadth of executive power.
Furthermore, the ambit of cases that are politically salient (the "5 percent" of
cases referenced by then-Senator Obama) may be increasing. The Republican
Party, for example, now espouses a litmus test that nominees must be in favor
of limiting the administrative state, a vast expansion from the one-case litmus
test of Roe v. Wade. 18
Follow-up studies should also address this study's methodological
limitations. We used the Monte Carlo method to estimate the actual
probabilities of a decision, but future studies should use a model that actually
computes the probability for each possible combination of Supreme Court

&

116. There are numerous examples of this, including but not limited to the various exceptions
to the exclusionary rule (see, e.g., Jeffrey L. Fisher, Preface: Reclaiming CriminalProcedure, 38
GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xv (2009); Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A
Critique of the Supreme Court's Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 757, 758 (2009)) and restrictions on abortion rights (see, e.g., Mary Ziegler,
Substantial Uncertainty: Whole Woman's Health v Hellerstedt and the Future of Abortion
Law, 2016 SUP. CT. REv. 77, 82 (discussing the pro-life incrementalism strategy)).
117. 151 CONG. REc. 21032 (2005) (statement of Sen. Obama).
118. See Interview with Donald McGahn, then-White House Counsel, at Conservative Political
Action Conference on Judicial Selection (Feb. 22, 2018). McGahn states that Gorsuch's views on
needing to rein in the administrative state are part of a broader plan, that they discuss the views of
political nominees on the administrative state, and that their selection is different than past years
when it was a single-issue litmus test. For commentary on these remarks and their significance, see
Adam Liptak, Trump's New JudicialLitmus Test: Shrinking 'the Administrative State,'N.Y. TIMES
(Mar.
26,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/us/politics/trump-judges-courtsadministrative-state.html [https://perma.cc/BG2C-MHD7].
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Justices. Such studies could help to support the findings of this Essay and add
to the robustness of its conclusions.
Importantly, the Essay also points to possible mechanisms to limit the
dangers of term limits, including appointing Justices who are inclined to
exhibit less loyalty to their appointing president's party and more deference
to prior precedent. Of course, a nominating president would likely seek
Justices with just the opposite inclinations, so it is unclear how these
safeguards could be implemented. Future studies should also seek to assess
the extent to which these safeguards are actually utilized by Justices and the
interaction between the two factors.
Conclusion
Our findings suggest that the danger of increased instability due to term
limits is very real and that policy makers should take that risk into account
when considering the proposal. Furthermore, this reduced stability could
fundamentally change the nature of jurisprudential evolution and change the
focus of litigants, policy makers, and lower court judges from precedent to
the Court's composition. Any proponent of term limits has the burden to
show that strategies exist, and can be effectively utilized, to mitigate these
dangers and that countervailing benefits can be sufficiently realized. To date,
no proponent has carried this burden, but this study helps provide a path to
do so.
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